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PROTECTION ACT: UNDERMINING A
WOMAN'S RIGHT TO AN ABORTION
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INTRODUCTION
During the last few years, many states have passed laws criminaliz-
ing conduct that injures or causes the death of a fetus.1 In the 1995
session of the Michigan legislature, a conservative Republican State
Senator, William Van Regenmorter, proposed "The Prenatal Protec-
tion Act."2 This bill would criminalize virtually any injury to a fetus,
with little regard for the wrongdoer's intent. Senate Bill 515 has a
"medical exemption" which is intended to preserve a woman's con-
stitutional right to have an abortion3 However, despite this exemp-
tion, Senate Bill 515 has two constitutional defects.
First, Senate Bill 515 violates the Supremacy Clause of the Consti-
tution because U.S. Supreme Court decisions do not permit the
Michigan legislature to legally characterize a fetus as a child or a per-
son. 4 Section 3 of Senate Bill 515, for example, refers to the great
bodily harm or death caused the "unborn child, the unborn child's
*Associate Professor, The Thomas M. Cooley Law School; BA., Yale University;J.D., The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. The author would like to thank Professors Phillip Prygoski and
Stephen Sheppard for their advice and suggestions, Kelley Breckenridge for her assistance with
the research, and Randy Diamond for his first rate work in the library. I also want to thank Na-
thanielJohson who is a staff member with the Michigan House of Representatives Democratic
Party leadership. This article is based on a written statement that I submitted to the Judiciary
Committee of the Michigan House of Representatives upon testifying against the constitutional-
ity of Senate Bill 515.
1. IOWA CODE § 707.7 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (1991); OKiA. STAT. tit. 21, §
713 (1991); seegenerally People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 620-23 (Cal. 1994) (MoskJ., dissenting).
2. S.B. 515, 88th Leg. (1995). The text of the bill appears in Appendix.A of this article.
3. S.B. 515 § 19(b).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a state lacks a compelling interest in
protecting the fetus and in prohibiting abortion until viability); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (determining that a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion
before viability of the fetus without an undue burden by the state).
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mother, or another person."' The statute then describes the "unborn
child" as the "live unborn offspring of a human being at any time or
stage of development from conception until birth."6 These charac-
terizations of the fetus as a person from the moment of conception
violate the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in Roe v. Wad and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.8
Second, Senate Bill 515 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
because it will often be unclear whether a fetal miscarriage early in
the pregnancy is caused by an act of a third party or by the frequent
spontaneous abortions that can occur at an early stage of pregnancy.9
The problem with determining causation is compounded by the ab-
sence of a clear intent standard in several parts of the statute. The
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that an unclear criminal law regulat-
ing abortions is void for vagueness when the statute also lacks a
meaningful intent requirement.0 This reasoning applies to Senate
Bill 515. Moreover, Senate Bill 515 is overbroad because its vague-
ness means that it inevitably will be used by prosecutors against peo-
ple who did not actually cause the injury or death of a fetus.
Senate Bill 515 is also bad public policy. It imposes excessive
criminal penalties on individuals who may accidentally cause injury
to a fetus even if the mother is virtually unharmed, and even if nei-
ther the wrongdoer nor the woman knows that the woman is preg-
nant. Senate Bill 515 therefore provides little protection to pregnant
women. By contrast, an alternative bill, House Bill 5531," proposed
by Michigan Democratic Representative Laura Baird, avoids these
constitutional and practical problems and would protect pregnant
women.
This article has six parts. Part I describes Senate Bill 515's provi-
sions in more detail, as well as the provisions of the Baird alternative.
Part II reviews the legal rules established by the Supreme Court's two
most famous abortion decisions. Part III explains why Senate Bill
515 violates the Supremacy Clause. Part IV shows how Senate Bill
5. S.B. 515 § 3(2) (emphasis added).
6. S.B. 515 § 2.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
9. D. Keith Edmonds, Early Embsyonic Mortality in Women, 88 FERTI~n' & S1TRIY 447,
451 (1982) (explaining that "...total embryonic loss is very high, sixty-two percent of all detected
pregnancies terminating prior to twelve weeks.").
10. Colauttiv. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
11. H.B. 5531, 88th Leg. (1995) (providing protection from assault to pregnant women
without considering the fetus a person). The text of this proposed bill appears in Appendix B
of this article.
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515 is vague and overbroad. Part V demonstrates that passage of
Senate Bill 515 would be bad public policy. Finally, Part VI clarifies
how the Baird alternative avoids these problems. The goal of this ar-
ticle is to show states how they can protect pregnant women without
infringing on a woman's abortion rights.
I. EXAMINING THE PROPOSED STATUTES
Senate Bill 515 would criminalize virtually all injuries caused to a
woman's "unborn child." The bill has received great support from
"Right to Life" groups.12 By contrast, Representative Baird's alterna-
tive bill is designed to protect women from injuries during preg-
nancy. House Bill 5531, therefore, avoids the constitutional issues
raised by Senate Bill 515. Representative Baird's bill has received
support from groups such as Planned Parenthood and the ACLU. 3
Each bill will be discussed separately.
A. Senate Bill 515
Senate Bill 515 is designed to protect the "unborn child," which is
defined as "the live unborn offspring of a human being at any time
or stage of development from conception until birth."14 Thus, it does
not matter whether the fetus is three weeks old or six months old.
Senate Bill 515 penalizes maliciously-caused injuries to the unborn
child more than negligently-caused injuries. "Maliciously" is defined
in Section 3 as, "[wiith the intent to cause the death of the unborn
child, the unborn child's mother, or another person." In short, Sen-
ate Bill 515 defines the fetus as a person.
The penalties in Senate Bill 515 are quite severe. For example,
Section 4 provides that a person who intentionally causes the death
of an unborn child shall receive twenty-five years to life in prison.
Section 5 is a variation on state felony murder laws. It maintains that
a person who commits a crime such as attempted arson, criminal
sexual conduct, or robbery which, in turn, results in the death of an
12. Pregnant Woman ProtectionAct." Hearings on S.B. 515 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judidary,
88th Leg. (1995) (testimony of Edward Rivet, Legislative Director, Right to Life of Michigan, on
file -with the clerk of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
13. House ConsidrsBill to Create Ciimes Against Unborn Children, ARGUS PRESS, Mar. 21, 1996,
at 8; Jennifer Loven, State House Gon Bils to Create Crmes Against Unborn Children, MACOMB
DAILY, Mar. 21,1996, atA1.
14. S.B. 515 § 2.
15. S.B. 515 § 3(2) (a). Several other parts of the statute have similar characterizations of
the unborn child as a person. See, ag., S.B. 515 § 3(c); S.B. 515 § 4.
16. S.B. 515 § 4.
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unborn child shall be imprisoned for twenty-five years to life."
Moreover, the penalties are serious even for conduct that is not ma-
licious.
Section 6, for example, provides that a person who causes the
death of an unborn child by any assault may be imprisoned for up to
fifteen years and fined $7500.18 An assault may occur with any un-
wanted contact that one person has with another.19 This grave pun-
ishment may be applied regardless of the fetus' stage of develop-
ment.
Section 11 states: "A person who drives any vehicle...without
due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as
to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property and
thereby causing great bodily harm to an unborn child.. .is guilty of a
felony.... This provision therefore criminalizes simple negligence
in driving. The punishment can be up to two years in prison.21 Sec-
tion 12 states that a person who operates a vehicle "at an immoderate
rate of speed," or "negligently," and who causes the death of an un-
born child can be imprisoned for up to two years as well.2
Senate Bill 515 also has a rather extraordinary provision which
places the burden of proof on the criminal defendant regarding the
status of the fetus at the time of injury.2s Section 18 maintains that
the pregnant woman's fetus will be presumed to have been alive at
the time of the alleged violation.24 This presumption against the de-
fendant exemplifies the severity of Senate Bill 515.
B. The Baird Alternative
Representative Baird's bill provides an alternative to Senate Bill
515 that would protect the legitimate interests of pregnant women
from injury without labeling the fetus as a person.
The operative part of House Bill 5531 specifies:
If a person knows or has reason to know that a woman is
17. S.B. 515 § 5.
18. S.B. 515 § 6.
19. See, eg., Stowers v. Ardmore Acres Hosp., 172 N.W.2d 497, 503 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969),
a.f'd sub nora., Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mch. 1971) (holding that the absence of
pain and suffering in non-consensual touching does not mean no assault occurred); People v.
Zuniga, 223 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (remarking that assault simply requires
purposeful, non-consensual touching).
20. S.B. 515 § 11.
21. Id.
22. S.B. 515 § 12.
23. S.B. 515 § 18.
24. Id.
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pregnant and physically injures that woman by committing or
attempting to commit a crime and that injury results in a mis-
carriage or serious physical injury to the fetus, the person is
guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not more than
10 years.'
House Bill 5531 also has an express abortion exemption.26 The bill
defines "serious physical injury" as meaning "...substantial bodily dis-
figurement..." to the fetus, or impairment of "...the function of a
body organ or limb of the child that develops from the fetus."2
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN ROE AND CASEY
The two leading U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing whether a
fetus can be considered a person are Rom and Casey9 In Roe the
Court struck down a Texas statute that criminalized abortionsOm The
Court ruled that the statute violated a woman's liberty interests un-
der the Due Process Clause!' The Court said that "...the word
'person' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include
the unborn." 2 The Court also rejected Texas' argument that life be-
gins at conception," and that the states have a compelling interest in
protecting this potential life from and after conception.-
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, established a trimester
framework for analyzing the states' interests in abortion regula-
tions."' States have a compelling interest in the mother's health after
the first trimesternm But the states lack a compelling interest in the
"potential life" until viability, namely between six to seven months
into the pregnancy.7
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion and upheld Roe's determination that a fetus is not a per-
25. H.B. 5531 § 90A(1).
26. H.B. 5531 § 9OA(5).
27. H.B. 5531 § 90A(6) (B).
28. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
31. Id-
32. d. at 158.
33. Id. at 159.
34. I& at 163.
35. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.
36. Id. at 163.
37. Id. at 163. "The 'compelling' point is at viability.., because the fetus then...has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." rd.
251
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
son." Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O'Connor also gave an elo-
quent and extended discussion of stare decsisss Stare decisis is the
doctrine that courts should generally honor their precedents rather
than reverse positions suddenly. In Casey, the Court noted that stare
decisis is especially important on fundamental matters of personal
liberty such as a woman's right to an abortion 0  The Justices ex-
plained that the public's confidence in the good faith of an
unelected judiciary would be shaken if such vital legal precedents
were not honored.4
The Court, however, repealed Justice Blackmun's trimester ap-
proach and ruled instead that, before viability, state abortion regu-
lations would be allowed that did not "unduly burden" the woman's
right to an abortion.4 The Court, however, still fixed viability as the
point where the "...[s]tate's interest in fetal life is constitutionally
adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions."
In other words, Casey reaffirmed Roe's central holding that the state
lacks a compelling interest in preserving the potential life of the fe-
tus until viability.
To sum up, the Supreme Court in Casey and Roe ruled: (1) that a
fetus does not constitute a person under the federal constitution;
and (2) that states lack a compelling interest in protecting that po-
tential life until it reaches viability. Case F eloquent defense of stare
decisis also demonstrates the Court's -adherence to its precedents on
fundamental matters of personal liberty.
IM. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ISSUES RAISED BY DEFINING A
FETUS AS A PERSON
The Court's decisions in Roe and Casey, and the Constitution's Su-
premacy Clause, do not allow the Michigan legislature to define a fe-
tus as a person. Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion contains the Supremacy Clause which states: "This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof.. .shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
38. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845 (explaining the state's interest in "the fetus that may become a
child"); I& at 876 (discussing the state's interest in "potential life").
39. 1& at 854-69.
40. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856-57.
41. Id. at 868-69.
42. Id. at 873.
43. Id at 874-78.
44. Id at 860.
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laws of any state to the contraty -notwithstanding."' Thus, any conflicts
between state and federal law must be resolved in favor of the su-
preme federal law.'
In Marbuy v. Madison,47 the Court made clear that the Court is the
final arbiter of whether legislation complies with the U.S. Constitu-
tion by declaring: "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."" This is the doctrine of
judicial review. Taken together, the Supremacy Clause and Marbury
mean that state laws will be struck down by courts when they conflict
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution.Y
Senate Bill 515's definition of the fetus as a person runs afoul of
the Supremacy Clause because the U.S. Supreme Court rejected that
definition in Roe and Casey when it defined a "person" under the
Fourteenth Amendment as not including a fetus!' The Michigan
legislature cannot legislate around these rulings.
Law Professor Ronald Dworkin of NYU Law School and Oxford
University discusses the definition of a fetus in his 1993 book, Life's
Dominion, which analyzes the Supreme Court's abortion decisions
in Roe and Casey!' He writes that one effect of these cases is that:
States have no power to overrule the national constitutional
arrangement and if a fetus is not part of the constitutional
population under that arrangement, states cannot make it
one. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution declares that
the Constitution is the highest law of the land. If that means
anything, it means that the rights the national Constitution
guarantees individual American citizens cannot be repealed
by the legislatures of the several states, either directly, by flat
repealing legislation, or indirectly, by packing [adding to] the
constitutional population....An American state, then, has no con-
stitutional power to declare a fetus a person or to protect fetal in-
terests at the expense of its citizens' constitutional rights. 2
In 1981, during Congressional debate on a proposed "Human Life
Bill," a dozen constitutional law scholars and six former United
45. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).
46. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824).
47. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
48. Id. at 177.
49. See, eg., Cooperv. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
50. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 845 (discussing the state's interest in "the
fetus thatimay become a child").
51. RONALD DWoRKIN, LIFE's DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EuTHANASIA,
AND INDIVDUAL FREEOOM (1993).
52. I& at 114-15 (emphasis added).
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States Attorneys General, with diverse views on abortion, all agreed
that Congress lacked the power to define a fetus as a person. s Their
reasoning indicated that the states also lacked this powerss
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School, another consti-
tutional law scholar, testified that "the Supreme Court in Roe held a
state powerless..." to enshrine a theory of life.5 Professor Tribe ex-
plained that the Supreme Court in Roe "had no doubt whatever
about the meaning of 'person' under the Constitution. They left no
opening there... Wat the Court was holding was that the State cannot im-
pose its answer "s He further explained:
If one disagrees with that view, one is not disagreeing on a
question of fact-What is the fetus? What is a human being?
-but on a basic proposition of constitutional law. The only
way to undo a proposition of constitutional law announced by
the Court is by constitutional amendment, not by legislative
redefinition of constitutional language
7
He cited Marbury to support his position.ss
Professor William Van Alstyne of Duke University Law School said
at these same hearings that:
The decision in Roe v. Wade is equally emphatic with regard to
the meaning of the word "person" as it appears in the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Reconstruction Congress did not
have in mind and did not intend to include among the bene-
ficiaries of section 1, zygotes, blastulas, embryos or fetuses!'
Professor Van Alstyne likewise referred to Marbuy to show that this
kind of legislation could not stand6
The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated this interpretation of Roe is
correct. In Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,0' the
Supreme Court affirmed by memorandum a U.S. District Court rul-
53. The Human Lfe Bilk Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on theJudkiary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 248 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings] (Statement
of Laurence H. Tribe). Among the constitutional law professors who signed the letter were Paul
Brest,.ohn Hart Ely, Paul A. Freund, Erwin N. Griswold, Louis Henkin, Philip B. Kurland, Louis
B. Schwartz, Telford Taylor, Laurence H. Tribe, William Van Alstyne, Harry H. Wellington, and
Charles Alan Wright. The U.S. Attorney General signees, who came from both parties, were
Herbert Brownell, Jr., Nicholas Katzenbach, Ramsey Clark, Elliot L. Richardson, William B.
Saxbe, and Benjamin R. Civiletti.
54. . at 249.
55. Id
56. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 243.
58. Hearings, supra note 53, at 250.
59. Hearings, supra note 53 at 277 (statement of William Van Alstyne).
60. Hearings, supranote 53 at280-81 (letterfrom William VanAlstyne).
61. 380 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. La. 1974), a.fd mem., 419 U.S. 1098 (1975).
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ing stating:
State legislatures have...attempted to accord a purely statutory
right to fetal life at the expense of abridging a woman's consti-
tutionally protected right. Such legislation has been ruled un-
constitutional. A State cannot by legislative fiat, infringe upon an
area which has been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court
from State interferencm .
Several other post-Roe U.S. Supreme Court decisions have rejected
efforts to treat the fetus as a person. The Supreme Court in Colautti
v. Franklie found unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law which said
that if the aborted fetus appeared to be viable, the doctor had to take
the same actions necessary to preserve its life that would be required
in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive. The Court said:
[N]either the legislaturenor the courts may proclaim one of
the elements entering into the ascertainment of viability-be
it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor
-as the determinant of when the State has a compelling in-
terest in the life or health of the fetus.r'
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,s the Su-
preme Court rejected the constitutionality of an Akron, Ohio law
which made physicians performing abortions criminally liable unless
they "insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a
humane and sanitary manner.''6 The municipality required the fetus
to be treated like a person, namely, to be buried in a "humane"
manner. The Supreme Court found this "decent" and "humane"
burial requirement, which existed even at the earliest stage of em-
bryo formation, to be unacceptable under Roe, particularly since phy-
sicians who violated the provision could be held criminally liable."'
The Court in Akron also found unconstitutional Ohio's require-
ment that the doctor tell the woman "the unborn child is a human
life from the moment of conception," saying the requirement vio-
lated the Roe holding that "a State may not adopt one theory of when
life begins to justify its regulation of abortions."6 The Akron Court
62. Rosen, 380 F. Supp. at 877 (emphasis added).
63. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
64. Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added).
65. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overmded on other grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
66. Akron, 462 U.S. 416,424 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 452 n.44 (distinguishing Akron from Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Fitzpatrick, 401
F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.l. Pa. 1975), where the state characterized the legislative purpose of an
Ohio laivassimply"to preclude the needless dumping of abortedfetuses onto garbage piles").
68. Akron, 462 U.S. 416,444 (citingRe, 410 U.S. at 159-62).
255
256 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 5:247
majority opinion said that the dissent "would uphold virtually any
abortion-inhibiting regulation because of the State's interest in pre-
serving potential life....This analysis is wholly incompatible with the
existence of the fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade." 9
Other lower federal courts have decided the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not permit states to enact legislation defining a fetus as a
person."0
It is true that, unlike the cases discussed above, Senate Bill 515
has a medical procedure exemption, a self-defense exemption, and
an exemption for the mother's actions.7' The medical procedure
exemption apparently is designed to avoid having the statute conflict
with a woman's right to an abortion. According to this exemption,
the medical procedure must be performed by a physician or other
licensed medical professional at the mother's request or the request
of her legal guardian." It also applies to the lawful dispensation or
administration of lawfully prescribed medication.73 The self-defense
exemption applies to any act committed in lawful self-defense or de-
fense of another.7w
These exemptions, however, do not avert the direct conflict be-
tween the federal definition of a person and the definition in Senate
Bill 515. Moreover, these exemptions simply reflect a more subtle
effort to gradually undermine Roe and Casey by developing a new
body of law affording the fetus the same rights as a person. The
gradual erosion of the Roe and Casey holdings that this statute would
cause would just as certainly violate the Supremacy Clause as the
69. Id. at 419 n.1. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 n.10 (1966) (stating that
Bill of Rights provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
their "own force" prohibit certain state laws).
70. S4 ag, Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156, 159 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974)
(holding that the Rhode Island legislature lacks the power after Roe to "defin[e] some creature
as an unborn child, to be a human being and a person from the moment of its conception");
Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that "[s]ince the fetus is not a per-
son...neither is it a 'child'"). But seeWebsterv. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,491
(1989) (holding a statement in an anti-abortion statute's preamble that life begins at concep-
tion was constitutional because it simply "express[ed]....[a] value judgment" in the abstract).
Senate Bill 515, however, would enact this valuejudgment as legislation and would therefore be
unconstitutional.
71. S.B. 515 § 19(a)-(c).
72. S.B. 515 § 19(b).
73. Id.
74. S.B.515§19(c).
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statutes in the above cases.] The statement in Casey on the impor-
tance of stare decisis in the abortion area does not permit such efforts
to undermine Roe and Casey.
IV. THE VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH CONCERNS WITH
SENATE BILL 515
In Kolendar v. Lawson76 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a
criminal law must provide adequate notice to the defendant and to
the law enforcement authorities of the prohibited conducLt The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires such notice
to prevent arbitrary enforcement of the criminal laws. 8 In Colautti,
the Court applied these principles to strike down a statute as vague
that criminalized certain conduct connected to abortions!' Senate
Bill 515 is unconstitutionally vague because its causation standard is
indeterminate and because it has several sections which lack a mean-
ingful intent requirement, similar to Colautti. This vagueness also
makes it overbroad because it will likely be used to prosecute inno-
cent people.
Senate Bill 515 permits the prosecution of individuals who injure
or kill a fetus even if the fetus is only a few weeks old. Criminal con-
victions under virtually all sections of the statute are contingent on a
determination as to whether a third party has "caused" an injury to
the fetus or its death." Yet, determining causation is difficult be-
cause, as one study on embryo mortality has reported: "[miore than
sixty percent of all pregnancies end spontaneously, often before the
woman is aware that she is pregnant."8 Indeed, this figure covers the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy according to reliable medical stud-
75. Se DWoRIN, supra note 51 at 113-16 (stating that defining a fetus as a person adds to
the constitutionally protected populace and thus dilutes the woman's right to an abortion); c.
Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (describing how the gradual recogni-
tion of new rights closely related to, and originating in, certain more fundamental rights can
dilute those fundamental rights); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the Frat Amend-
Ment 85 COLUM. L REV. 449, 486, 488 (1985) (arguing that creating new free speech rights will
"undercut' society's commitment to the noble value of free speech). Similarly, affording a fetus
the same rights as a person diminishes the value of that person's rights with regard to their right
to abort a fetus.
76. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
77. I& at 357-58.
78. rd.
79. C0oautt, 439 U.S. at 379 (1979).
80. S.B. 515 § 3.
81. Edmonds, supranote 9, at 451.
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ies.8 2 These spontaneous abortions can occur due to the woman's
genetic makeup, environmental factors, developmental matters, and
the effect of earlier abortionsss
The causation issue will, therefore, be highly debatable and hence
vague in many cases because of the natural fragility of the fetus. The
issue will be particularly difficult in instances where the miscarriage
does not occur until several hours or days after the mother has con-
tact with the defendant, since natural complications could have in-
tervened.! Another problem is that some provisions, such as Section
11 of Senate Bill 515, criminalize conduct that causes "great bodily
harm" to the fetus.! It is not clear, however, what it means to cause
"great bodily harm" to a one-month-old embryo.
The vagueness of this bill is compounded by the lack of any clear
intent requirement in several sections. In Colautti, the Supreme
Court dealt with a vague criminal statute that required doctors who
perform abortions to determine whether the fetus is or may be vi-
able. The Court found the statute unconstitutional and stated:
This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a
vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that
standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea....Because of
the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision direct-
ing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be
viable, the statute is little more than a "trap for those who act
in good faith.""5
Several recent federal court cases have relied on the lack of any
meaningful mens rea (intent) requirement to strike down other abor-
82. Bicka A. Barlow, Comment, Severe Penaltesfor the Destrudion of "Potential Li"--Crusl and
Unusua1.Punishmen4 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 463, 494 (1995). Examples of studies discussed by Barlow
include D. Keith Edmonds, Early Embryonic Mortality, in HUMAN EBRYONIC AND FETAL DEATH 1,
2 (Ian H. Porter & Ernest B. Hook eds., 1980); Sam Shapiro & Dean Bross, Risk Factors for Fetal
Death in Studie of Vital Statistic; Data: Inferenc and Limitations, in SPONTANEOUS AND RECURRENT
ABORTION 89, 91 (MichaelJ. Bennett & D. Keith Edmonds eds., 1987).
88. Id. at 495. According to the author,
[a] serious question arises as to whether the defendant actualy causes the death of
such a young fetus, unless the mother dies at the same time.
Those states that criminalize the killing of a fetus from conception on, or from
seven to eightweeks of age, are punishing a defendant for the death of a fetus during
the window of time when the fetus has the highest probability of being spontaneously
aborted. The application of proximate cause to fetal homicide in these jurisdictions is
troublesome, especially in light of the scientific evidence that sixty-two percent of
pregnancies will be aborted within the first twelve weeks of gestation.
Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added).
84. See Connally v. General Constr., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (defining a law as vague
where persons of "common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and djffer as to its
application.") (emphasis added).
85. S.B. 515 § 11.
86. Colautt4 439 U.S. at895 n.12.
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tion-related regulations which contain criminal penalties 7 The U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized the disfavored nature of strict liabil-
ity criminal offenses outside the abortion context as well.s"
Senate Bill 515, however, is virtually a strict liability criminal statute
because it does not matter whether the wrongdoer knows a woman is
pregnant. Virtually any injury to a fetus caused by a third party is
prosecutable, including those resulting from ordinary vehicular ac-
cidents. Section 7 permits a person to be convicted of a felony and
jailed for up to fifteen years for engaging in grossly negligent acts
which result in the death of the fetus, even if the wrongdoer did not
know a fetus existed. In Section 6, a person who assaults a pregnant
woman (e.g., places her in reasonable fear of harm through threat of
force or violence), but does not physically injure her in any way or
know she is pregnant, may be subjected to a fifteen year felony jail
sentence if the person's actions somehow cause the "unborn child"
to die.
89
Senate Bill 515, therefore, violates the constitutional presumption
that a criminal statute should at least require the prosecution to
prove the defendant acted with knowledge the woman was preg-
nant." The vagueness of the causation requirement, the lack of any
meaningful intent requirement in several sections, and the excessive
penalties in this statute make it unconstitutionally vague.
A criminal law is overbroad if it permits the conviction of a sub-
stantial number of people who have not engaged in any criminal ac-
tivity.9' Because of its vagueness concerning causation, Senate Bill
515 allows prosecutors to prosecute defendants who did not proxi-
mately cause any injury to the fetus.
Senate Bill 515's overbreadth problem is illustrated in Section 18
which states: "In a prosecution for an alleged violation of this act,
evidence proving that the mother of the unborn child was pregnant
prior to the time of the alleged violation shall give rise to a rebuttabl
87. Se, e-g., Planned Parenthood, Sioux Fals Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.Sd 1452, 1463-67 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that a strict criminal liability statute would have a chilling effect on willing-
ness of physicians to perform abortions); Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911
F. Supp. 1051, 1081-87 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that the lack of mes tea requirement in a
statute which imposes criminal liability may indicate the statute is unconstitutionally vague).
88. See, ag., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437-38 (1978)
(holding that intent is an element of a criminal antitrust offense).
89. S.B. 515 § 6.
90. Se generally Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444.
91. See ag., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (holding that a statute that makes it
illegal for people to gather at a street comer and engage in conduct that is "annoying" to
passersby is overbroad because its vagueness gives law enforcement authorities unfettered dis-
cretion to apply it to people who have done nothing illegal).
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presumption that the unborn child was alive at the time of the alleged
violation."9 2 This section allows a prosecutor to obtain a guilty verdict
in cases without proving the defendant's acts proximately caused the
fetus' death. Instead, it requires the defendant to prove the fetus
died as a natural complication of the pregnancy. Section 18, there-
fore, converts the constitutional presumption of innocence into an
unconstitutional presumption of guilt.93 Innocent people will be
jailed if this bill becomes law, and it will not survive constitutional
scrutiny.
V. THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.
An example can best illustrate why Senate Bill 515 is bad public
policy. Imagine a twenty-one-year-old Michigan State University stu-
dent who has a lot of alcohol to drink at a private party. He is legally
entitled to drink alcohol. Afterwards, he decides to sober up by walk-
ing to the 7-Eleven for coffee. He pushes open the door, and it acci-
dentally strikes a woman, standing by the cash register, in the abdo-
men. She is a few weeks pregnant, but does not know it. She is a bit
shaken up but otherwise feels fine. A few hours later, however, she
has a miscarriage, which doctors conclude may have been caused by
the door striking her abdomen. The twenty-one-year-old could be
prosecuted for violating Section 7 of Senate Bill 515 because that
provision only requires gross negligence. If convicted, he would be
guilty of a felony punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. This
punishment scheme is cruel and arbitrary.
This example highlights several problems. If the law's goal is to
protect a fetus or to protect a woman's right to carry her pregnancy
to term, that goal cannot be fulfilled if it permits the prosecution of
individuals who accidentally injure a woman without any knowledge
that she is pregnant.
Moreover, a seven-week-old fetus is undeveloped, and roughly the
size and weight of a peanut. Severe criminal penalties, such as life
imprisonment or fifteen to twenty-five years in jail, are cruel and
cannot be justified simply because a person accidentally causes an
injury to, or the death of, such an undeveloped and fragile entity.
Such penalties for abortions were certainly not in existence when the
92. S.B. 515 § 18 (emphasis added).
93. Se eg., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697 (1975) (finding that the state cannot
make the defendant prove the absence of an element of the crime); Morrissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 275 (1951) (holding criminal intent is an essential element of a crime).
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Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Adoption of Senate Bill 515 will also waste Michigan taxpayers'
monies because of the need to defend the statute from the inevitable
constitutional challenges that it will face in court. Senate Bill 515 is
especially wasteful because any real interests the State has can be sat-
isfied by adopting the Baird alternative, which will likely not face a
court challenge. These problems with Senate Bill 515 show why leg-
islators motivated by religious or political goals cannot make a non-
partisan determination of when life begins.
It is perhaps for these reasons that most states do not have laws
that define the fetus as a person from the moment of conception,
and do not criminalize such a wide range of conduct directed at the
fetus.9s Two states that have similar statutes are Minnesota and Illi-
nois. Neither statute, however, is as broad as the one proposed
here9 The Illinois criminal statute, for example, has an intent re-
quirement.7 Although courts in those states have upheld their nar-
rower statutes from constitutional attacks, they have not addressed
the specific constitutional arguments raised here. It simply does not
make sense for a state to have a strict liability criminal statute for ac-
cidentally injuring a pre-viable fetus.
VI. THE ABSENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH
THE BAIRD BILL
The Baird alternative avoids these constitutional problems. It re-
quires that the pregnant woman, and notjust the fetus, be physically
injured. The State certainly has a compelling interest in criminaliz-
ing such conduct. The Baird Alternative avoids Supremacy Clause
problems by not defining the fetus as a person, and it does not im-
pose any presumption of guilt on defendants. The Baird Bill is also
not vague or overbroad since its intent requirement states that the
94. Se4 eg., Ro 410iU.S. at 138 (noting that after the Civil War, the states began to outlaw
abortion but the criminal sanctions were "leniene before quickening, referring to the point
when a woman is "quick with child.").
95. The dissenting opinion in People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 620-23 (Cal. 1994), contains a
detailed survey of which states have criminal laws prohibiting the injury or killing of a fetus, and
describes the scope of these laws. Itshows that few states have criminal laws as broad as Senate
Bill 515.
95. S4 eg., MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West 1996) (making it a crime to cause death or
injury to an unborn child as a result of operating a motor vehicle "in a grossly negligent man-
ner, in a negligent manner while under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any
combination of those elements; while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, as
measured within tvo hours of the time of driving").
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720 § 5, para. 9-1.2 (Smith Hurd 1996) (defining intentional homi-
ide of an unborn child as the infliction of death or great bodily harm to a pregnant woman or
her unborn child and exempting consensual abortion as such).
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defendant must know of the pregnancy beforehand.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, Senate Bill 515 may look like a reasonable attempt
to protect a woman's interest in seeing her pregnancy go to term. A
closer examination, however, reveals that it is a transparent attempt
to treat the fetus as a legal person. Such a law violates the Constitu-
ion's Supremacy Clause. Its vagueness and overbreadth ultimately
undermines a woman's right to an abortion. Thus, Senate Bill 515
should be rejected and the Baird alternative embraced. The Baird
alternative protects the legitimate interests of the woman and the fe-
tus in avoiding injury, without unnecessarily pretending that the fe-
tus is a person.
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APPENDIX.A
Senate Bill 515
A bill to define certain crimes against prenatal children; to define
and allow certain practices; and to prescribe certain penalties.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
Sec. 1. This act shall be knowii and may be cited as "The Prenatal
Protection Act."
Sec. 2. As used in this act, "unborn child" means the live unborn
offspring of a human being at any time or stage of development
from conception until birth.
Sec. 3. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person who
maliciously causes the death of an unborn child by any assault, inflic-
tion of injury, or any other means or action upon the mother, is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of
years.
(2) As used in this section, "maliciously" means any of the fol-
lowing:
(a) With the intent to cause the death of the unborn child,
the unborn child's mother, or another person.
(b) With the intent to cause great bodily harm to the unborn
child, the unborn child's mother, or another person.
(c) In willful or reckless disregard of the likelihood that the
natural tendency of the assault, infliction of injury, or other action
taken will be to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, the un-
born child, the unborn child's mother, or another person.
Sec. 4. A person who causes the death of an unborn child in viola-
tion of section 3 is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by im-
prisonment for life or any term of years but not less than 25 years -if
the assault, infliction of injury, or other action causing the death of
the unborn child is committed with a premeditated intent to cause
the death of the unborn child, the unborn child's mother, or an-
other person.
Sec. 5. (1) A person who causes the death of an unborn child in
violation of section 3 is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment for life or any term of years but not less than 25 years
if the assault, infliction of injury, or other action causing the death of
the unborn child is committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a criminal offense involving arson, criminal sexual
conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child abuse in the first
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degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, home inva-
sion, larceny of any kind, extortion, or kidnapping.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) "Arson" means any felony violation of Chapter X of the
penal code, Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931.
(b) "Major controlled substance offense" means any of the fol-
lowing:
(i) a violation of section 7401(2) (a) (i) to (iii) of the public
health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section
333.7403 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(ii) a violation of section 7403 (2) (a) (i) to (iii) of the public
health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section
333.7403 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(iii) a conspiracy to commit an offense listed in subdivision (i)
or (ii).
Sec. 6. Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person who
causes the death of an unborn child by any assault or intentional in-
fliction of injury upon the mother of the unborn child is guilty of a
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a
fine of not more than $7,500, or both.
Sec. 7. Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person who
commits a grossly negligent act that is a direct and substantial cause
of the death of an unborn child is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than
$7,500, or both.
Sec. 8. A person who assaults or inflicts an injury upon a woman,
known by that person to be pregnant, with the intent to cause the
death of the woman's unborn child is guilty of a felony punishable
by imprisonment for life or any term of years.
Sec. 9. A person who assaults or inflicts an injury upon a woman,
known by that person to be pregnant, with the intent to cause great
bodily harm to the woman's unborn child is guilty of a felony pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not
more than $5,000, or both.
Sec. 10. Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person who
causes an aggravated injury to an unborn child by any assssault or in-
tentional infliction of injury upon the mother of the unborn child is
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both.
Sec. 11. A person who drives any vehicle upon a highway carelessly
and heedlessly in willful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety
of others, or without due caution and circumspection and at a speed
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or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person
or property and thereby causing great bodily harm to an unborn
child, but not causing death, is guilty of a felony punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than
$2,000, or both.
Sec. 12. A person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any
highway or upon any other property, public or private, at an immod-
erate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but
not willfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of an unborn child is
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more
than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000, or both.
Sec. 13. A person who operates a vehicle in violation of section
625(1) or (3) of the Michigan vehicle code, Act No. 300 of the Public
Acts of 1949, being section 257.625 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,
and causes the death of an an unborn child is guilty of a felony pun-
ishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not
less than $2,500 or more than $10,000, or both.
Sec. 14. A person who operates a vehicle in violation of section
625 (1) or (3) of the Michigan vehicle code, Act No. 300 of the Public
Acts of 1949, being section 257.625 of the Michigan Compiled Laws,
and causes great bodily harm to an unborn child is guilty of a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of
not less than $1,000 or more than $5,000, or both.
Sec. 15. A person who operates a vessel on the waters of this state
in violation of section 80176 of Part 801 (marine safety) of the natu-
ral resources and environmental protection act, Act No. 451 of the
Public Acts of 1994, being section 324.80176 of the Michigan Com-
piled Laws, and causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a fel-
ony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a
fine of not less than $2,500 or not more than $10,000, or both.
Sec. 16. A person who operates a vessel on the waters of this state
in violation of section 80176 of Part 801 (marine safety) of the natu-
ral resources and environmental protection act, Act No. 451 of the
Public Acts of 1994, being section 324.80176 of the Michigan Com-
piled Laws, and causes great bodily harm to an unborn child is guilty
of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or
a fine of not less than $1,000 or not more than $5,000, or both.
Sec. 17. In a prosecution of a violation of this act committed dur-
ing the first trimester of pregnancy, the prosecutor shall be required
to prove the existence of the unborn child by admissible evidence of
a laboratory analysis or by testimony of a physician or other licensed
medical professional.
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Sec. 18. In a prosecution for an alleged violation of this act, evi-
dence providing that the mother of the unborn child was pregnant
prior to the time of the alleged violation shall give rise to a rebutta-
ble presumption that the unborn child was alive at the time of the
alleged violation.
Sec. 19. This act does not apply to any of the following:
(a) An act committed by the mother of an unborn child.
(b) A medical procedure performed by a physician or other li-
censed medical professional at the request of a mother of an unborn
child or the mother's legal guardian or the lawful dispensation or
administration of lawfully prescribed medication.
(c) An act committed in lawful self-defense or defense of an-
other, or which is otherwise legally justified or excused.
Sec. 20. The imposition of a criminal penalty for a violation of this
act does not preclude the prosecution and sentencing of a person
for any other applicable criminal violations.
Sec. 21. This act shall take effect May 1, 1996.
APPENDIX B
The Baird Alternative
Substitute for House Bill No. 5531
A bill to amend act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, entitled as
amended "The Michigan Penal Code," as amended, being sections
750.1 to 750.568 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, by adding section
90(a).
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
Section 1. Act No. 328 of the Public Acts of 1931, as amended, be-
ing sections 750.1 to 750.568 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, is
amended by adding section 90 (a) to read as follows:
SEC. 90A. (1) If a person knows or has reason to know that a
woman is pregnant and physically injures that woman by committing
or attempting to commit a crime and that injury results in a miscar-
riage or serious physical injury to the fetus, the person is guilty of a
felony and shall be imprisoned for not more than 10 years.
(2) The mandatory term of imprisonment prescribed by this
section is in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of
the underlying crime or attempt to commit the crime. The court
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may impose the term of imprisonment prescribed by this section to
be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprison-
ment imposed for the conviction of the underlying crime or attempt
to commit the crime.
(3) In a prosecution for a violation of this section committed
during the first trimester of pregnancy, the prosecuting attorney
shall prove the existence of the pregnancy by evidence of a labora-
tory analysis and by testimony of a physician or other licensed medi-
cal professional.
(4) This section does not apply to an act committed by the
pregnant woman.
(5) This section does not apply to performing a lawful abor-
tion.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Person" means an individual, partnership, association,
limited liability company, corporation, or other entity. Person does
not include a governmental entity.
(b) "Serious physical injury to the fetus" means an injury to
the fetus' physical condition that results in or is likely to result in
substantial bodily disfigurement to or seriously impairs the function
of a body organ or limb of the child that develops from the fetus.

